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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DONALD W. YORK, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
vs. 
KENNETH V. SHULSEN, Warden, 
Utah State Prison and DAVID L. 
WILKINSON, Attorney General, 
State of Utah, 
Respondents/Appellees. 
Case Number: 920378 CA 
Priority Number 3 
REPLY BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
REPLY TO THE STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The issue of this Habeas Corpus proceeding, both at the Lower Court and on appeal, 
is not the guilt or innocence of the Petitioner, but rather his competence to enter a plea of 
guilty to an offense that he had no memory of committing. With this issue in mind, the 
Petitioner disagrees with the Statement of Facts as the same are set forth in the 
Respondent's brief. 
As an example, the Respondent begins its statement of facts with a foot note that 
reads: 
Because petitioner pled guilty and was thus not subject to a trial on the 
merits, the facts are gleaned from various sources in the record and presented 
in the light most favorable to the habeas court's ruling. See Bundy v. Deland 
739 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1988). 
The Respondent apparently interprets this to mean that since there was no trial record it 
1 
is free to pick and choose facts as well as misquote statements, use sources not admitted or 
used in any of the Lower Court proceedings, both at the trial level and during the Habeas 
hearing, add or distort information; and then present it as fact. This is all done, according 
to the Respondent, to present a record Hin the light most favorable to the habeas court's 
ruling." 
As a further example, Moreover, the first three paragraphs of the Respondant's 
Statements of Facts are taken from the deposition of Dr. Alma Carlisle and refer specifically 
to his account of his memory of statements made to him while the Petitioner was under 
hypnosis. This deposition was never referred to or entered as an exhibit in the Habeas 
hearing and as such was not part of the record before the Writ Court nor is this deposition 
part of the record on appeal. 
While some assertions and allegations set forth in Respondent's statement of facts 
may be appropriate to an appeal after a trial on the merits of this case, the majority of the 
stated facts are simply irrelevant to this proceeding. This Court is therefore referred to the 
Appellant's Brief for a more consistent and better supported statement of the relevant facts. 
SUMMARY OF THE REPLY ARGUMENT 
The both the record before the Trial Court and manifest indications of the Petitioner 
to the Trial Court were sufficient for the Trial Court to order further evaluations of, and a 
competency hearing for, the Petitioner. The Trial Court erred by not entering such an 
order. 
The record before the Writ Court together with the evidence produced and testimony 
adduced through the witnesses and Petitioner were sufficient for the Writ Court to grant the 
Petitioner's Writ of Habeas Corpus. The Writ Court erred by not granting the Petitioner's 
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application. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE MADE A 
FINDING OF COMPETENCY. 
The Trial Court having received the Petitioner's notice of intent to rely on the 
defense of insanity or diminished mental capacity, ordered an examination of the Petitioner 
by Heber C. Kimball, Ph.D. and Chris Ghicadus, M.D., to determine emotional/mental state 
of mind of Petitioner at time crime was committed. 
The Respondent, in its asserts: 
"...[T]he trial court ordered the mental examinations solely to determine 
petitioner's sanity, as required by section 77-14-4" 
The Respondent continues with: "Contrary to petitioner's assertions, both doctors 
conclusively determined petitioner was not mentally ill." (Respondent's Brief P 18) 
Apparently the Respondent does not understand what "mental illness", "mental 
health", "competency", "insanity" and "diminished mental capacity" are. 
Section 76-2-305(4) UTAH CODE ANN. (1953) (as amended) reads: 
(4) "Mental illness" means a mental disease or defect. A mental defect may 
be a congenital condition or one the result of injury or a residual effect of a 
physical or mental disease." Emphasis added. 
Both of the appointed examiners found the closest diagnoses they could reach to 
describe the "dysfunction" of the Petitioner, which they diagnose as Borderline Personality 
Disorder, which they described as resulting in: 
"[HJaving difficulties in marriage, difficulties in employment, problems 
with employers, instability in living situations, sometimes making irrational 
decisions, being labile in mood from depressive to expansive moods, and 
perhaps tolerating or living deviant lifestyles." (Habeas Exhibit No. 2). 
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Emphasis added. 
Suffering from Borderline Personality Disorder certainly cannot make an individual 
free from "mental illness" or provide "mental health". In fact, the point that persons 
suffering from this disorder are prone to "sometimes making irrational decisions" should be 
another indication of possible problems with the Petitioner's competency. 
The Petitioner fully agrees that the alienists were directed to determine the mental 
and emotional condition of the Petitioner at the time the crime was committed. However, 
an examination of the evaluations indicates that neither examiner was able or willing to state 
what the emotional or mental state of mind of the Petitioner was during or at the time of 
the crime. However, they both state that additional testing and evaluations were needed. 
...[S]ince he states that he has a hiatus or a memory loss or amnesia for the 
events from leaving California up to the time he walked into the police 
station, makes it virtually impossible to assess in retrospect his intention or 
state of mind at the time of the alleged commission of the crime. 
The diagnostic dilemma also leads one into another area of this 
person's dysfunction and that is the possibility, where albeit minimal, is that 
of some organic pathology. The history indicates some time in the 70's of 
some head and neck injuries...one would have to reckon with the possibility 
of a person having some kind of rare "seizure-like" activity in the brain that 
might render them incapacitated for periods of time and the only way this 
would be resolved would be with a totally complete neurologic examination 
that might include computerized tomographic brain scans, 
electroencephalograms. 
The diagnostic category seems to give me the most trouble... Currently, 
the diagnosis that encompasses this very descriptive disorder is borderline 
personality1... They usually may be buffeted and traumatized somewhere in 
\ Borderline Personality Disorder may coexist with Multiple Personality Disorder. However, often the 
person with Multiple Personality Disorder is incorrectly diagnosed as having only Borderline Personality 
Disorder because the alternation of the personalities is mistakenly thought to be the instability of mood, self-
image, and interpersonal behavior that characterizes Borderline Personality Disorder. Similarly, other mental 
disorders may coexist with or obscure the presence of Multiple Personality Disorder. Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (Third Edition - Revised) (herein after "DSM-III-R") American Psychiatric 
Association 1987. Emphasis added. 
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childhood and end up never really satisfactorily dealing with life. That is, 
having difficulties in marriage, difficulties in employment, problems with 
employers, instability in living situations, sometimes making irrational 
decisions, being labile in mood from depressive to expansive moods, and 
perhaps tolerating or living deviant lifestyles. (Habeas Exhibit No. 2) 
However, he continues to complain of sometimes blackouts, inability 
to recall certain episodes during periods of trauma as well as during the so-
called normal functioning periods. He claims that he was hyperactive as a 
child and that at one time he was on phenobarbital, which is a drug often used 
for epileptic seizure control. ...there is evidence in the records for learning 
disability, possible dyslexia, a couple of accidents where there was some brain 
injury supposedly. It is my opinion that further examination is in order, 
including brain scan and electroencephalograph to rule out any possible after-
effects. 
Diagnostically, he fits the borderline personality disorder closer than 
anything else. 
There is a possibility he was suffering from intermittent amnesic 
episodes because of the trauma of the incident, similar to the trauma that a 
15 year old girl would have memory-wise if she had been raped. Once again, 
there is no medical history or evidence of any fugue or dissociative states 
which would have reduced his capacity to control his impulses at the time of 
the alleged crime. (Habeas Exhibit No. 3) 
Both appointed examiners found problems with the Petitioner's emotional condition, 
lapses of memory2 or dissociative states, history of both physical as well as emotional 
problems which, in fact, were symptomatic of the mental condition, Multiple Personality 
Disorder3, (hereinafter referred to as "MPD") which was subsequently discovered later when 
2
 . Amnesia may be relevant as a symptom indicating a present defect or abnormality in a defendant's 
reasoning ability. See State v Swanson, 626 P.2d 527, (Wash. App. 19 ) at 528. 
3
. From the DSM-III-R (p 271) we learn the characteristics of MPD: 
Age at onset. Onset of Multiple Personality Disorder is almost invariably in childhood, but most cases 
do not come to clinical attention until much later. 
Course. The disorder tends to be chronic, although over time the frequency of switching between the 
personalities often decreases. 
Impairment. The degree of impairment varies from mild to severe, depending primarily on the nature 
of, and relationships among, the personalities and only secondarily on their number. 
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Dr. Carlisle attempted to assist the Petitioner in assessing his mental condition and to 
discover why he had no memory of the crime. 
Dr. Jeppsen comments in his evaluation: 
Mr. York's childhood history, lifestyle and symptomatology are 
characteristic of that of Multiple personality disorder. Multiple personality 
disorder is not an easy diagnosis to make unless it is suspected. Both Drs. 
Ghicadus and Kimball were uncertain of the diagnosis and diagnosed 
borderline personality disorder. Borderline personality disorder is not 
incompatible with multiple personality disorder. As a matter of fact, most 
multiple personality disordered people fit the criteria for borderline 
personality and vice versa; there is frequently an overlap between these two. 
In my opinion, Mr. York suffered from a multiple personality disorder 
secondary to his longstanding abusive childhood and that he was confused by 
memory lapses which resulted from his multiple personality disorder. (Habeas 
Exhibit No. 1) 
Dr. Carlisle at the Petitioner's Habeas hearing testified that: 
"We had revived the memory. We had worked with the personality 
who referred to himself as Dan Hell. I believed that there were others." 
(Habeas P 47 L 20 - 22) 
The Respondent has made the same error that both the Trial Court and the Writ 
Court have made. When the appointed examiners stated they required additional testing 
to provide the Trial Court with the answer to the question "was there a possibility he was 
suffering from a mental illness or that he had diminished mental capacity at the time the 
crime was committed" the Trial Court should have provided a means for the additional 
testing to answer the question it had asked. Since the Petitioner was unable to pay for this 
additional testing the Trial Court should have ordered those tests and evaluations at State 
expense. 
Predisposing factors. Several studies indicate that in nearly all cases, the disorder has been preceded 
by abuse (often sexual) or another form of severe emotional trauma in childhood. 
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A. Well, I was — I went to see the doctors, and the lawyer was to get 
me some doctors, but I ran out of money, and I couldn't get an insanity plea. 
I didn't have any money to pay for the doctors at the time. (Habeas P 8 L 13-
17) 
Chavez v. United States 656 F.2d 512 (9th Cir. 1981) at 515 teaches that: 
Due process requires a trial court to hold a hearing, sua sponte, on a 
defendant's competence to plead guilty whenever the trial judge entertains or 
reasonably should entertain a good faith doubt as to the defendant's ability to 
understand the nature and consequences of the plea, or to participate 
intelligently in the proceedings and to make a reasoned choice among the 
alternatives presented. Citing Sailer v. Gunn, 548 F.2d 271, 275 (9th Cir. 
1977). On review, our inquiry is not whether the trial court could have found 
the defendant either competent or incompetent, nor whether we would find 
the defendant incompetent if we were deciding the matter de novo. We 
review the record to see if the evidence of incompetence was such that a 
reasonable judge would be expected to experience a genuine doubt respecting 
the defendant's competence. Citing Bassett v. McCarthy, 549 F.2d 616, 621 
(9th Cir), cert, denied, 434 U.S. 849, (1977)). 
The Chaves Court continues with: 
If all the evidence should raise a reasonable doubt about the 
defendant's competence, a hearing is required for due process reasons. This 
is true even if the psychiatrist's report 'indicates' sanity or competence and 
thus would not require a hearing under the statute. Id. at 517. Emphasis 
added. 
Here, instead of the Trial Court taking action to enable the examiners to provide the 
information requested, the Trial Court, and the Respondent look at statements concerning 
the examiners opinions as to the ability of the Petitioner at the time of testing. Even this 
is flawed because the Petitioner did not possess a knowledge of the crime, as all reports 
indicated. This alone would hinder his assisting his attorney in preparing his defence. The 
Petitioner testifies in the Habeas hearing: 
tf
...[T]hey had an insanity plea that Judge Page accepted, because I 
couldn't relate to my lawyers enough for them to do anything. They were kind 
of scared of me, I guess, at the time. They didn't know how to handle me." 
(Habeas P 7) 
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The State is correct, competency was not the question asked by the Court when 
ordering the evaluation of the Petitioner. Instead, the Trial Court asked, "was the Petitioner 
suffering from insanity or diminished mental capacity at time crime was committed?" This 
question was never answered by either of the appointed alienists. 
The subsequent teachings of Bailey {State v. Bailey, 111 P.2d 281 (Utah 1985)) 
notwithstanding, before taking any other action in this case it was the responsibility of the 
Trial Court to either obtain the answer for the question it had asked, or, with the Petitioner's 
withdrawal of his notice of intent to offer the defense of insanity or diminished mental 
capacity, to determine if the Petitioner was competent to withdraw his notice. 
As with the waiver of all rights, waiver of an NGI [Not Guilty by 
Reason of Insanity] plea must satisfy certain conditions to be constitutionally 
valid. In particular, the defendant must be capable of making and must 
actually make an intelligent and voluntary decision. (Citation omitted). This 
requires the trial judge to "conduct inquiry designed to assure that the 
defendant has been fully informed of the alternatives available, comprehends 
consequences of failing to assert the [insanity] defense, and freely chooses to 
raise or waive the defense. State v. Jones, 664 P.2d 1216, 1221 (Wash. 1983), 
citing Frendak v. United States, 408 A.2d 364, 380 (D.C. 1979) and State v. 
Khan, N.J. Super 72, 82, 417 A.2d 585 (N.J. 1980). 
... [T]he only permissible inquiries when a defendant seeks to waive his 
insanity defense are whether he is competent to stand trial and whether his 
decision is intelligent and voluntary. Id. at 1222. Emphasis added. 
There is no record of the withdrawal of the Petitioner's Notice to offer the defense 
of insanity or diminished mental capacity, let alone a hearing to determine what knowledge 
and understanding the Petitioner had concerning such withdrawal. Nor is there any record 
of any attempt to determine if Petitioner was competent to stand trail. 
Despite the Respondent's attempt to inform us of the reason the Petitioner entered 
his guilty plea. The fact is, the Court appointed examiner's findings and reports were totally 
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inconclusive as to the condition of the Petitioner at the time of the crime. The Petitioner's 
testimony at the Habeas Hearing indicated he didn't have money to hire doctors or for 
testing. He also states: 
"All I remember is that they were supposed to have a hearing, a 
competency hearing, and they never did, because I couldn't afford the 
doctors." {Habeas P 8 L 23-25, P 9 L 1) 
The Petitioner maintains that the Trial Court erred by accepting the Petitioner's guilty 
pleas without first determining that the Petitioner was competent to waive his insanity or 
diminished mental capacity defense, or determining that the Petitioner's decision was 
intelligent and voluntary. The Supreme Court of the United States held in Henderson v. 
Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 644 (1976) that: 
...[S]uch a plea cannot support a judgment of guilt unless it was voluntary in 
a constitutional sense. (Footnote omitted). And clearly the plea could not be 
voluntary in the sense that it constituted an intelligent admission that he 
committed the offense unless the defendant received "real notice of the true 
nature of the charge against him, the first and most universally recognized 
requirement of due process." (Citation omitted). 
The Respondent continues to labor under the erroneous idea that the issufe is 
whether or not the Petitioner requested a competency hearing and that the only time the 
court is required to hold a competency hearing is if the defendant or prosecutor requests 
one. However, § 77-15-4 UTAH CODE ANN. (1953) (as amended) provides: 
The court in which a charge is pending may direct the prosecuting attorney to 
file a petition pursuant to Section 77-15-3(1). 
Accordingly, the Trial Court also has a responsibility to assure that the defendant is 
competent to proceed with what ever process is before the court. The responsibility of the 
Trial Court is expressed in People v. Thomas, 616 N.E.2d 695 (111. App. 1993) where we learn 
at page 696 that: 
9 
Once facts are brought to attention of trial court which raise a bona 
fide doubt of defendant's fitness to enter a plea, the court has a duty to hold 
a fitness hearing. 
The Trial Court had before it the Petitioner's Notice of intent to offer a defense of 
insanity or diminished capacity. The appointed examiners having examined the Petitioner 
to determine his state of mind at the time of the crime stated they could not fully evaluate 
the Petitioner owing to his amnesia. Both evaluators stated additional testing would be 
required to determine the Petitioner's state of mind. They also indicated they had a 
problem determining the exact type of emotional problem he had concluding with a 
diagnoses of Borderline Personality. Both the Petitioner and his attorney requested an 
additional evaluation. Moreover, the Petitioner's trial counsel had argued the Petitioner's 
emotional and mental problems. This, in light of both Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966), 
and Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975) both of which were subsequently clarified by our 
Supreme Court in State v. Bailey 712 P.2d 281 (Utah 1985) should have indicated to the 
Trial Court that additional testing of the Petitioner was necessary and that a competency 
hearing was required and the Trial Court was empowered pursuant to § 77-15-4 UTAH CODE 
ANN. (1953) (as amended) to direct such additional evaluations for the purpose of 
determining the Petitioner's competency. 
If these indicia of incompetence did not, either individually or collectively, reach the 
levels of the evidence in Pate or Drope, supra, they are enough to have created doubt as to 
the Petitioner's ability to make a reasoned choice. They were, therefore, sufficient to require 
an evidentiary hearing on that issue before the Petitioner's guilty plea was accepted. See 
Chavez v. United States 656 F.2d 512 (1981). 
The Petitioner's MPD was the cause of his diminished capacity during these stressful 
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periods of the Petitioner's life. Dr. Jeppsen provided the following insight into the mental 
and emotional condition of the Petitioner during this time period: 
In my opinion, Mr. York suffered from a multiple personality disorder 
secondary to his longstanding abusive childhood and that he was confused by 
memory lapses which resulted from his multiple personality disorder. I do not 
think he was competent to stand trial. He did not have a clear memory of the 
offense even though he pled guilty. Mr. York is unable to remember his 
attorney telling him that he would go to prison if he pled guilty. In fact, he 
was convinced that he was going to be sent somewhere for some treatment 
instead. 
Mr York was suffering from multiple personality disorder during the 
crime and at the time of his trial when he pled guilty. He pled guilty to a 
crime without a clear memory for it. His memory and reasoning ability at the 
time of his trial impaired his ability to make a clear choice and to cooperate 
with his attorney. Whether or not he is guilty of the crime of which he is 
accused is not the issue and can only be decided by a trial. (Habeas Exhibit 
No. 1) 
What I do know is that multiple personality disorders, under stress, 
disassociate. And Mr. York was under stress at the time. I would expect him 
to be disassociating at the time. (Habeas P 71). 
Dr. Carlisle states: 
All we know is, in therapy, at one time they are talking as though Don 
- well, they say that Don came back and went to the police station, but, in 
another part, in talking to Dan, he is talking as though he is at the police 
station. So I don't know who is at the police station. Or maybe even a third. 
(Habeas P 60-61) 
The Respondent relies on People v. Thomas, 616 N.E.2d 695 (111. App. 2 Dist. 
1993) and Commonwealth v. Martin 616 N.E.2d 814 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993) and alleges 
"amnesia, the only arguable manifestation of Petitioner's subsequently diagnosed MPD in 
the trial court, did not render him incompetent." In both of these cases the key statement 
is "amnesia by itself does not render an accused person incompetent. Also of note is that 
in both cases the amnesia was involved with the use of alcohol, a very different cause of 
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amnesia than MPD. Nevertheless, while "amnesia alone should not supply basis for 
declaring defendant incompetent to stand trial "... amnesia is a factor to be considered in 
determining whether defendant is able to meet test of competency to stand trial and to 
obtain fair trial." State v. Owens, 807 P.2d 1292 (Kansas 1990) Emphasis added. 
The Petitioner's problem was not amnesia for the crime. The Petitioner was suffering 
from blackouts or transfer of personalities which resulted in the loss of information from one 
personality to another. The Petitioner did not have an understanding of what was occurring 
in relation to his defense and it was his trial counsel and not the Petitioner that told the 
Trial Court what the Petitioner knew and understood. Compare this with what occurred in 
People v. Thomas, supra: 
Defendant was able to understand nature and purpose of proceedings 
against him and to assist in defense and thus, was fit to enter a guilty plea; at 
sentencing hearing defendant gave lucid speech on his own behalf in which he 
recounted how his criminal behavior resulted from his addiction to alcohol.... 
The court admonished the defendant... and he represented to the court that 
he understood nature of charges against him and that plea was voluntary. Id. 
at 698. 
In Commonwealth v. Martin 616 N.E.2d 814, 816 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993), "at the 
defendant's request, the judge reads both reports discussed the contents with counsel, and 
conducted a brief colloquy with the defendant. 
The Petitioner maintains that had the additional testing and evaluation, requested by 
his appointed evaluators occurred there is good reason to believe that the Petitioner's MPD 
would have been discovered and the outcome would have been considerably different. 
The Petitioner maintains that the Trial Court did not afford him due process by 
accepting his plea when there was sufficient evidence to indicate the possibility that 
Petitioner was not competent to enter a plea. 
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...[F]ailure to hold full hearing where there is a "substantial question of 
possible doubt" of defendant's competence is error. (Citations omitted)....The 
issue may require further inquiry, despite early findings of competence, if 
subsequent events or testimony raise doubt. (Citations omitted). Id. at 816. 
As is pointed out in Chavez, (Chavez v. United States 656 F.2d 512 (1981)) a judge 
is responsible for more than sifting through arguments presented by Petitioners and 
defendants. Chavez teaches that it is the trial court's responsibility, especially in criminal 
cases, to protect a defendants due process rights. Of prime importance is to be alert to 
information which indicates there might be a problem with the defendants ability and 
competency to participate in their own trial and especially to waive their rights protected by 
the Federal and State constitutions. 
Here, in the face of the Petitioner's Notice of intent to offer a defense of insanity or 
diminished capacity, the Trial Court never did avail itself of an any opportunity to have a 
"face to face with any living witness", nor did it order any additional testing indicated in the 
alienists reports to determine the Petitioner's state of mind and emotion at time of crime. 
In fact the Trial Court rejected both the Petitioner's implied request and his trial counsel's 
direct request for a 90 day evaluation and its attendant report. 
Furthermore, the Trial Court, in its final comments at the Petitioner's sentencing 
provides an insight into the its viewpoint concerning the rights of the Petitioner as well as 
need for support from expert opinions as it states its feelings concerning the 
mental/emotional state of the Petitioner. 
THE COURT: ...I feel that as a result of the background of Mr. York, 
he certainly was in a position where he did not have the training that maybe 
some of the other of us had, but I feel that he was never in a circumstance 
nor ever has been where he could not extricate himself from those 
circumstances, in short of taking a life. 
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I will be frank, Mr. York, if it were possible for this Court to impose 
the enhancement provision, I would have imposed those also. I figure and 
feel that any consideration to your background in the terms of leniency as far 
as you were concerned were imposed by the State of Utah in reducing this 
from a capital felony down to one of a second degree homicide. ...your state 
of mind is such that you are a danger to society. (Habeas Exhibit H) 
Emphasis added. 
From the Trial Courts own statements it is fair to assume that the Trial Court had 
assumed its personal feelings were sufficient to determine the Petitioner's state of mind. 
This is not acceptable. In fact the Trial Court makes an evaluation of the Petitioner's state 
of mind that can not be supported by the evaluations of either of the appointed evaluators. 
In addition the Trial Courts statements also indicate it was attempting to circumvent 
the plea as far as possible and ignore any information that might be mitigating for Mr. York, 
including his mental/emotional condition. 
I will be frank, Mr. York, if it were possible for this Court to impose 
the enhancement provision, I would have imposed those also. ...Though it may 
well be that facilities are available that come over the years, put you in a 
position where you can return to society and be a constructive member, but 
I don't think that's going to happen for a considerable length of time and only 
if you really want that.... But in the meantime, your state of mind is such that 
you are a danger to society to be allowed to be anywhere but at the Utah 
State Prison. (Habeas Exhibit H) 
This evaluation was made on the strength of the Pre-Sentence Report (hereinafter 
"PSR"). There never was a trial. The Trial Court goes far beyond the findings of the 
appointed evaluators. In fact the Trial Court allowed to happen precisely what the Utah 
Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice, Utah Sentence and Release Guidelines 
attempts to prevent: "No longer will presentence investigators4 and the Board of Pardons 
attempt to compensate for plea bargaining." (Cited in La brum v. Board of Pardons et al, 227 
4
. The Pre-Sentence Investigator and writer of the Petitioner's Pre-Sentence Report was the wife of one 
of the prosecutors in this case, that is Melvin Wilson. 
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Utah Adv. Rep. 30, 33 (SC, 12/06/93)). In fact it did worse, it denied the Petitioner his 
constitutional rights of due process and substituted instead the Trial Courts own feelings 
toward the Petitioner's situation and his punishment. The Petitioner believes that this is not 
right and seeks the opportunity to exercise those rights denied him by the Trial Court. 
POINT II 
THE WRIT COURT ERRED BY FINDING THE PETITIONER 
COMPETENT TO ENTER A GUILTY PLEA. 
The Writ Court attempted to avoided the issue of competency of Petitioner by stating 
"After plea bargaining, petitioner changed his pleas to guilty to an amended information..." 
(Writ Court Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law) The Writ Court joins the 
Respondent and the Trial Court in confusing the question of what the alienists were asked 
to determine. The Writ Court apparently believes that a person who the appointed 
evaluators cannot determine their state of mind at the time of the crime does not need any 
additional testing to discover that state of mind. Moreover, if those persons are unable to 
obtain that additional testing then they should waive their constitutional right to a defense 
and enter a plea to that offense. 
The Respondent alleges that "the record fails to support Petitioner's claim that the 
Dusky (Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788 (I960)) standard was misapplied 
in this case" (Respondent's Brief P 26). They seem to believe that the Petitioner's 
dysfunction, due to his MPD, together with his loss of continuity of thought, would not effect 
his ability to know what was happening, make knowing and intelligent decisions, and 
participate in his own defense. 
This is contrary to the testimony provided by E. Allen Jeppsen, M.D., in the Habeas 
Hearing and his attendant Evaluation of the Petitioner, (Habeas Exhibit No. 1), as well as 
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supportive documentation from the DSM-III-R. Dr. Carlisle provides examples of the 
Petitioner's personality switching and even comments that he doesn't know which of the 
Petitioner's personalities was out at the police station immediately following the crime. 
The Respondent cites Lafferty v. Cook, 949 F.2d 1546 (10th Cir. 1991), (hereinafter 
"Lafferty / / ' ) , as supportive of the Writ Courts determination of the Petitioner's competence. 
However, the Writ Court uses the Petitioner's statements made in the Plea hearing as the 
supporting evidence that the Petitioner met the standards of competency. The statements 
made and demeanor of the Petitioner in the court room at the time of his plea cannot be 
used to support a finding of competency. Lafferty II states: 
The state court's assessment of the trial demeanor evidence upon 
revisiting the competency issue during and after trial is of doubtful validity 
given the court's mistaken view of Dusky's rational understanding 
requirements....The state court paid lip service to Dusky's requirement that 
competence requires a rational understanding which is different from, and 
more than, factual understanding. 
Under the state court's view, then, a defendant suffering from paranoid 
delusions is to be held competent to make decisions on how best to present 
his mental state to a judge and jury even though that mental illness may strip 
him of the ability to realistically determine where his best interests lie. Id. at 
1555-56. 
We conclude that the state trial judge applied the wrong legal standard 
in finding Lafferty competent to stand trial. Although we do not hold that 
Lafferty was incompetent as a matter of law, we do conclude that the record 
contains evidence from which a fact finder could have found him incompetent 
under the proper legal standard. Lafferty II at 1548 
The findings of fact supporting the Writ Court's finding the Petitioner competent 
reveal unambiguously that the Writ Court's evaluation of Petitioner was infected by a 
misperception of the legal requirements set out in Dusky, apparently caused by the court's 
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lack of knowledge of the underlying facts in that case. Indeed both the Writ Court and the 
Trial Court appear to have embraced the view that factual understanding alone is sufficient, 
a view as discussed above, that is totally contrary to the circumstances in not only this matter 
but in Dusky itself, and a view that has been rejected by the those courts applying the Dusky 
test. This court should not accept as consistent with Dusky and its progeny a finding of 
competency made under the view that a defendant who is unable to accurately perceive 
reality due to Multiple Personality Disorder need only act consistently with his disorder to 
be considered competent to enter a plea. See Lafferty II. 
In fact all the Writ Court does for its finding of fact is to list the history of the case 
and cite three answers that the Petitioner made during the plea hearing. From those finding 
of fact, excluding all other the testimony to the contrary, the Writ Court finds: 
Although suffering from MPD at the time of the crimes and of his plea, 
petitioner was able to understand the nature of the offenses, the nature and 
purpose the possible punishment and the nature of the proceedings against 
him. He was able to assist his attorney in his defense, and to make a rational 
choice to plead guilty. 
and thereon concludes: 
Because he understood the nature of the proceedings, and the 
punishment specified for the offenses and was able to assist counsel, petitioner 
was competent to plead guilty on October 29, 1984. State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 
1239 (Utah 1988). (Hereinafter Lafferty /). [State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239 
(Utah 1988), reversed on other grounds, Lafferty v. Cook, 949 F.2d 1546 (10th 
Cir. 1991)]. Habeas Court Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 12. 
It is shocking that the respondent should imply that the Petitioner has not given more 
than ample evidence that both the Writ Court and the Trial Court ignored and denied the 
Petitioner his due process. 
The state trial court's finding of competency in this case is fatally 
flawed by that court's assessment under a standard that is not only inconsistent 
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with Dusky, but was specifically rejected by the legal test for competency 
established in that case. In addition, when the evidence adduced on this issue 
is viewed under the proper standard, the record indisputably does not provide 
the fair support required to accord the finding a presumption of correctness. 
Lafferty II at page 1551. 
The Respondent alleges that the Petitioner must marshall all of the evidence. Again 
the Respondent is in error. There is no evidence to marshall, there was no trial, there was 
nothing except the records and testimony of witnesses which was presented to the Writ 
Court; which the Writ Court chose to ignore, except for the finding of MPD. 
It is ironic that the Respondent states that the Petitioner "merely reargues the 
evidence most favorable to him, leaving it to this Court to 'sort out' what evidence actually 
supports the habeas court's competency determination." That is precisely what the 
Respondent has done throughout its brief, in fact, the Respondent goes beyond rearguing, 
it creates, distorts, mis-quotes, and then says "it was never addressed before the appeal so 
it must be waived". Nevertheless, the Respondent then uses such "never addressed before 
appeal" information in its own argument. 
The Respondent states: "The only evidence supporting petitioner's assertion that his 
MPD rendered him incompetent to plead guilty came from petitioner's witness, Dr. 
Jeppsen..." Perhaps the Respondent believes that this Court is not alert or knowledgeable 
enough to discern fact from fiction, or perhaps the Respondent can't understand all of the 
testimony and evidence adduced in the Petitioner's Habeas Hearing or the documentation 
provided in his Brief. 
The Respondent continues with attempts to discredit the most experienced and 
knowledgeable witness present, E. Alan Jeppsen, M.D.. Dr. Jeppsen is a well known and 
highly respected Psychiatrist, in practice for over 20 years and having treated or seen more 
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than 60 patients with MPD. {Habeas P 60 and 69). Dr. Jeppsen's evaluations of what would 
be transpiring in the mind of the Petitioner are in complete accord with the description of 
MPD as outlined in the DSM-III-R. (A complete transcript of the entire description of 
MPD is provided as Appendix F in the Petitioner's brief). 
The Respondant would have this Court accept without question the often 
contradicting testimony of Alma Carlisle Ph.D., who was "trying to investigate MPD", 
{Habeas Hearing P 48 L19), and was seeing 21 patients with MPD with the assistance of Ms. 
Gilgen. {Habeas Hearing P 33-34). Dr. Carlisle's version of what he believes is occurring 
in the Petitioner's mind is not in agreement with the DSM-III-R and he detours from the 
accepted criteria and descriptions from the DSM-III-R with statements such as "I think it 
is really far more complex than what is generally believed." {Habeas Hearing P 52) 
The Respondent would have this Court believe "the record is devoid of indication that 
petitioner was unable to accurately perceive reality" (Respondent's Brief P 29) and that 
"during the plea colloquy petitioner claimed only that he could not specifically recall shooting 
Longhurst"(P 30). The Respondent makes the same error the Writ Court does and relies 
upon the plea colloquy to support their findings of competency. This is something which is 
not acceptable as detailed by Lafferty II. The Respondent, after attempting to discredit Dr. 
Jeppsen, quotes Dr. Carlisle's opinion that the Petitioner would be competent and capable 
of functioning without any problem. 
The Petitioner concedes that any of the Petitioner's separate personalities has or had 
the possibility to think rationally within the framework of its memories. Dr. Carlisle said the 
same: 
Q. Those rational decisions are based upon what their perceptions are, 
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what it is they are ultimately looking for? 
A. I think to a degree. Based upon their perceptions of what they think 
that they are charged with, and what could happen, because of those charges, 
depending upon how they plead. (Habeas Hearing P 64 L 5-10). 
However, how rational is an overall decision going to be if the Petitioner had two or 
more personalities who were not sharing what they individually knew with the other 
personality? None of the personalities could have a full and clear picture of what is 
occurring or what decisions should be made or what the consequences of those decisions are. 
Even a lay person can understand the confusion that would be in a persons mind if they are 
not receiving all the relevant information necessary for an informed decision. That is 
precisely what the Petitioner stated was his state of mind concerning his plea. This is the 
state of mind that Dr. Jeppsen was describing when he said: 
Mr York was suffering from multiple personality disorder during the 
crime and at the time of his trial when he pled guilty. He pled guilty to a 
crime without a clear memory for it. His memory and reasoning ability at the 
time of his trial impaired his ability to make a clear choice and to cooperate 
with his attorney. (Habeas Exhibit No. 1) 
Finally the Respondent tries to defend the Wit Courts rejection of any and all of the 
conflicting evidence and testimony in its final attempt to eliminate Dr. Jeppsen as a witness. 
This is done with an incomplete quote from Lafferty I at 1245, viz: "A finder of fact, 
whether judge or jury, is free to reject diagnoses and conclusions that are not adequately 
explained ... as unpersuasive and unhelpful." The full quote reads: 
A finder of fact, whether judge or jury, is free to reject diagnoses and 
conclusions that are not adequately explained. Even in the unlikely event that 
a fact finder understands the full significance of a psychological term such as 
"paranoid pseudo-community," the mere incantation of the term does not 
convey much of substance because it fails to describe the analysis and data on 
which the diagnosis was based, We do not mean to imply that doctors 
diagnoses in this case were necessarily incorrect. We simply hold that in the 
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absence of an adequate explanation, the trial court could properly reject as 
unpersuasive and unhelpful the conclusory labels that doctors assigned to 
Lafferty's condition. Lafferty I at 1245. 
The Supreme Court's full quote then, allows a trial court to reject a diagnostic term if it isn't 
accompanied with adequate explanation. Since the Writ Court has already accepted MPD 
this can only be seen as a less than proper means to justify the Respondent's unjustifiable 
point. Neither the Respondent nor the Writ Court can support their respective positions 
if evidence and testimonies presented at the Habeas Hearing are fully examined. 
Therefore, the Petitioner maintains that their was ample proof for the Writ Court to 
have made the determination that the Trial Court erred in accepting the Petitioner's guilty 
pleas. The Petitioner was not competent to have entered his pleas due to his affliction with 
MPD at the time of the crime, at the police station following the crime, at all of the 
subsequent hearings and court actions, during consultations with his attorney, and while 
being tested and evaluated by his appointed examiners. The Petitioner also maintains that 
the Trial Court should have ordered additional testing and held a competency hearing to 
determine the nature and extent of the Petitioner's mental abnormalities before proceeding. 
CONCLUSION 
Never has the Petitioner denied a crime or crimes were committed nor has he denied 
that he was present for at least part of the crime or crimes. Never has the Petitioner asked 
to be excused for any criminal action he may have taken. 
This is not a case where the State mounted a large and lengthy case against the 
Petitioner and a jury of his peers found him guilty. This is not a case where the Petitioner 
is requesting that he be relieved of all responsibility for a crime he may have committed and 
to set him free because he was suffering from MPD. This is a case where, upon obtaining 
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a diagnoses and the treatment, he had been asking for from the first, he discovered he had 
been present at the crime scene but possibly had not committed the crimes. He finds 
himself incarcerated, for almost ten (10) years, for crimes he may have not committed. His 
natural feelings and desires are to have his constitutionally mandated due process rights and 
to have this matter placed before a jury of his peers. 
Based on the foregoing the Petitioner respectively requests that this Court reverse the 
findings of the Court below and in so doing granting the Petitioner's Petition for a Writ of 
Habeas Corpus and remand this matter with directions for further proceedings consistent 
therewith. 
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